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New Developments on the 
Iraqi Economic Front 
Robert Looney* 
Introduction 
The news of the tum-around and recovery of Iraq's economy first 
received wide-spread attention following Ambassador Cracker's report to 
Congress in the fall of 2007. The Ambassador noted that the encouraging 
news that in some areas improved security was "stimulating revival of mar-
kets, with the active participation of local communities. War damage is 
being cleared and buildings repaired, roads and sewers built and com-
merce energized."1 According to the Ambassador: 
The IMF estimates that economic growth will exceed six percent for 2007. Iraqi min-
istries and provincial councils have made substantial progress this year in utilizing 
Iraq's oil revenue for investment. The 2007 governmental budget allocated $10 billion 
(nearly one-third Iraq's expected oil export revenue) to capital investment. Over $3 bil-
lion was allocated to the provinces and the Kurdish Region for spending. The latest 
data show that spending units (national ministries and provincial councils) have pro-
ceeded to commit these funds at more than twice the rate of last year. Doing the best 
are the provincial authorities, in the process gaining experience with making plans and 
decisions, and running fair tenders. In so doing, they are stimulating local business 
development and providing employment. Over time we expect the experience with 
more responsive local authorities will change Iraqi attitudes towards their elected lead-
ers, and of the provinces towards Baghdad.' 
On the other hand the Ambassador went on to note that the "Iraqi econ-
omy is performing significantly under potential." Insecurity in many areas 
resulted in increased transport costs which raised the cost of production 
and limiting the size of markets for critical agricultural and manufacturing 
*Robert E. Looney is a professor of economics, and Associate Chairman of the National 
Security Affairs department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He has 
written twenty books on various aspect s of development together with articles appearing 
in a number of scholarly journals. 
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goods. While electricity supply improved in many parts of the country, it 
was still insufficient to jumpstart the economy of Baghdad and its environs. 
Many neighborhoods in the city received two hours of electricity a day or 
less from the national grid, although power supplies for essential services 
such as water pumping stations or hospitals were much better. 
Poor services are not the only cause of dissatisfaction and frustration 
among the Iraqi population. As Frank Gunter has observed, "many Iraqis 
in and out of the government compare today's living standards to those of 
the oil boom of thirty years ago." Unfortunately after a failed take-off in the 
1970s, Iraqi per capita incomes are back where they were in 1950. 
As for the U.S. economic strategy in Iraq, Ambassador Crocker implicit-
ly acknowledged a shift from the failed top-down, large infrastructure proj-
ect approach that characterized the initial economic strategy to one 
focused on local development, and community-bas~d support programs: 
We are deploying our assistance funds to make a difference to ordinary Iraqis and to 
support our political objectives. Military units are using Commanders Emergency 
Response (CERP) funds to ensure that residents see a difference when neighborhood 
violence declines. USAID Community Stabilization Funds provide tens of thousands of 
jobs. With the recent apportionment of2007 Supplemental funds, we are putting "Quick 
Response Funds" in the hands of our Provincial Reconstruction Team leaders to build 
communities and institutions in post-kinetic environments. Vocational training and 
microfinance programs are supporting nascent private businesses. And in Baghdad, we 
are increasing our engagement and capacity building efforts with ministries.3 
On the surface, Ambassador Cracker's assessment suggested that the shift 
in U.S. economic strategy in Iraq was finally on the road to successes after 
years of accomplishing little in the way of tangible gains in employment and 
improved standards of living for the vast majority of Iraqi citizens. Looking 
back on Ambassador Cracker's assessment from the vantage point of a year 
later, was his optimism warranted? Or, are there still serious problems lurk-
ing beneath the surface? Are there other forces at work that cast doubt on 
the sustainability of the country's recent economic successes? 
Progress from a Macroeconomic Perspective 
Much of the optimism concerning the Iraqi economic recovery came 
from an International Monetary Fund (IMF) assessment of progress made 
under the country's Stand-By-Agreement with the Fund.4 While the fund 
3Jbid. 
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projected an economic expansion of 6 percent in 2007, it was with a num-
ber of caveats and uncertainties. Iraq is still an oil based economy, so the 
six percent growth rate is based on the assumption of a modest increase in 
oil production-reaching 2.1 million barrels per day (mbpd) with stable 
prices. However, the Fund goes on to note that: 
The economy remains extremely vulnerable to the country's security problems, which 
impede investment, inhibit private economic activity and hamper implementation of 
the structural reform agenda. In the event that investment and production in the oil 
sector cannot be increased as projected, lower oil revenue would result in higher fiscal 
deficits and sizable financing gaps from 2008. Absent access to significant external bor-
rowing, spending cuts would be necessary and unavoidable. The debt sustainability 
analysis indicates that Iraq's external debt remains also vulnerable to negative oil and 
rice production shocks.5 
In short, the Fund's forecast of 6 percent rate of growth was under the 
assumption· that no major unanticipated negative shocks hit the economy. 
If this did occur, the Fund cautions that the Iraqi authorities could do little 
to stem their adverse effects. The result might be a rate of growth consid-
erably below 6 percent. 
The IMF report also presented one of the more complete sets of data on 
the Iraqi economy. The disaggregated macroeconomic data revealed sev-
eral interesting trends that also raise questions on the sustainability of the 
country's recent economic expansion. While the quality of Iraqi data is 
always in question, there are several distinctive trends that even errors in 
the data cannot conceal. Given the slow expansion in oil production and 
its unfulfilled potential,6 the economy has had to rely to a certain extent on 
an expansion in the non-oil economy (Figure 1). 
'Ibid, pp. 13-14. 
0
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Figure 1 
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As things turned out, the IMF forecasts were on the cautious side. Crude 
oil production and exports, which had stagnated during 2005 and 2006 
rose during the second half of 2007 and have continued expanding 
through the summer of 2008. Rising output along with the high price of oil 
should increase Iraq's oil revenues to nearly $80 billion in 2008. 
What are the chances of a continued expansion in oil revenue, with per-
haps major increases over the next five to ten years? Much depends on the 
manner in which the country's controversial draft hydrocarbons law is 
resolved. Will it be approved by the Parliament? If it is signed, will oil com-
panies flock to the country, bringing the technology and billions of invest-
ment dollars needed to revive the industry?7 Since signing the draft law is 
part of the benchmarks for progress laid down by the U.S. Congress, it will 
undoubtedly become law eventually. On the other hand, the prospects are 
not particularly bright for an infusion of new investment into the dilapi-
dated industry. • 
'"Dividing the Wealth," Middle East Economic Digest 51: 18, May 4, 2007, pp. 4-5. 
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the reported growth rates are biased upwards because they do not reflect 
"new" output, but simply a reclassification of existing production from 
informal (where they are not counted) to formal (where they are counted) . 
Agriculture 
Iraq was once self-sufficient in food, but the agricultural sector has been 
on the decline for years. The sector accounts for about 25 percent of the 
workforce, but suffers from years of neglect. Much of the once state of the 
art irrigation system is crumbling, soil salinity is a major problem, and in 
many localities there has been a serious lowering of the water table. 
Under Saddam prices of inputs and outputs were largely government 
controlled. Production dropped dramatically in 1997 following the shift to 
cheap imports associated with the Oil for Food Program. To date the post-
Saddam era has seen little overall-change in Iraq's agricultural policy. 
According to a joint survey by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) and the World food Program, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 
2003 had little immediate effect on the agricultural sector. Especially in the 
north, agriculture was virtually untouched, and, elsewhere, all husbandry 
practices and field operations except harvesting had already been carried 
out when the war started in mid-March, and hostilities were over by mid-
April before the harvest had begun. 
Within the productive sectors this shift from informal to formal activity is 
probably the highest in agriculture, where farmers can transition from self con-
sumption and local barter to more formal markets as the rural security situation 
improves and distribution networks are revived. The IMF data (Figure 2) show 
that the non-oil sector is dominated by agriculture. Here expansion has been 
weak, with production not yet returning to the levels achieved in the last years 
of the Saddam Hussein regime. More troubling is the fact that there does not 
appear to be a strong recovery underway, with output actually falling in 2006. 
This pattern is particularly disappointing because, of the productive sectors, 
agriculture probably has the highest long-run growth potential. Given that a 
large percentage of the population is dependent on agriculture for their liveli-
hoods, a broad based economic expansion on the supply side is unlikely until 
the sector recovers. 
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Figure 2 
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Source, Compiled from: International Monetary Fund, Iraq: Statistical Appendix, IMF Country 
Report No. 071294 (Wahington: International Monetary Fund, August 2007), p. 3. 
While droughts have been partially responsible for the sector's problems, 
the fact remains that no coherent agricultural policy has emerged. U.S. offi-
cials would like to increase the yield on farmland still in production and 
see Iraq move to toward a free-market system. But Iraqi agricultural offi-
cials contend that crucial resources are too short for markers to make a 
quick transition into the world market. The Ministry of Agriculture con-
tinues to pay more than $200 a ton for wheat, more than the price in inter-
national markets, contending that the phase-out in price supports should 
be done over a 10-year period. 10 While the debates and inaction continue, 
early indications are that production in 2008 will be especially disappoint-
ing, owing to a combination of poor rains and sharp freezes in the winter.11 
'
0Doug Smith and Raheem Salam, "Dust Bowl Uncertainty Grows in Iraq; Farm 
Production has Fallen Below Prewar Levels. Without a Plan to Revive the Agricultural 
Sector, A Nation's Identity may Wither, Officials Say," Los Angeles Times, April 15, 2006. 
"Iraq: Country Profile 2008 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008), pp. 22-23. 
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Manufacturing 
Progress in the critical manufacturing sector has also been disappointing. 
The sector has been on the decline for some time with the ailing state 
enterprises of the Saddam Hussein regime increasingly unable to maintain 
production levels. The sector's contraction leveled off in 2004 with little or 
no expansion in the last several years. One new U.S. initiative under the 
direction of Paul Brinkley12 the Under Secretary of Defense for Business 
Transformation is to jump-start the sector by opening up a number of old 
state enterprises, many of which have been shut for years due to their high 
costs, uncompetitive outputs or stripped assets. 
Resurrection of the country's state owned enterprises does have its sup-
porters. Fareed Zak.aria contends that it would cost only $100 million to 
restart all of Iraq's state companies: "That's as much as the military will 
spend in the next J2 hours." 13 Still, the program has been extremely contro-
versial with the State Department and the Defense Department each 
adamantly opposed to the project at one time or another. There has been no 
period when both were whole-heartedly behind the project. Lack of cooper-
ation between U.S. government agencies will no doubt ultimately doom the 
project. As Rajiv Chandrasekaran recently observed: 1' "Paul Brinkley, a 
deputy undersecretary of defense has been called a Stalinist by U.S. diplo-
mats in Iraq. One has accused him of helping insurgents build better boml:5s. 
The State Department has even taken the unusual step of enlisting the CIA 
to dispute the validity of Brinkley's work." Given the history of this program 
it is no surprise that it is currently fraught with problems . 
. . . the implementation of that strategy has proved far more complicated and contro-
versial than anyone expected. Money to get the factories restarted has been hard to 
come by. Finding buyers for the goods in the U.S. has been even harder (only one com-
pany, a small Memphis retailer, has signed on so far). And that's on top of the 
Herculean challenges of doing business in a war zone where electricity is erratic, sup-
plies are scarce, and employees can get blown up on the way to work. '5 
The Bremer-Brinkly debate over Iraq's SOEs has raged on with advo-
cates of opening advancing additional rationales while those opposed have 
doggedly cited the many disasters associated with SOEs in the former 
"See his "A Cause for Hope: Economic Revitalization in Iraq," Military Review 87:4 
July/August 2007, pp. 2-11. 
13Fareed Zakaria, "The Surge that Might Work," Newsweek, August 21, 2007. 
"Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Defense Skirts State in Reviving Iraqi Industry," Washington 
Pas~ May 14, 2007, p. A.l. 
15Barney Gimbel, "One Man's Mission Impossible," CNNMoney.com, September 4, 2007. 
http: I / money. cnn .com/ 2007 / 08/ 31/m agazines/ fortune/ iraq_inc. fortune/ index. htrn 
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Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former 
Soviet Union. As one astute observer has noted: 16 
Who is right in the Bremer-Brinkley state owned enterprise (SOE) controversy? 
Brinkley is right in that in the short-term rapidly providing jobs should reduce support 
for the insurgency. But this favorable impact requires that the jobs be forthcoming in a 
reasonable period of time. Despite many optimistic announcements, few new SOE 
jobs have been created in the first year of the program. Bremer is right that in the long-
term a vibrant free market is more likely to provide enough jobs in the future for the 
large number of young Iraqis. But efforts to liquidate or privatize SO Es have stalled 
and, especially since the 2005 elections, the United States' ability to pressure the 
Government of Iraq into liquidation or privatization has decreased. 
As things turned out, over the year beginning in June 2007, dozens of 
state-owned enterprises have cautiously re-opened for business after years 
of neglect. The Iraqi government wants a cash injection of more than $2 
billion to turn round the fortunes of 42 of the best performing SOEs, 
including a Glass and Ceramics factory in Ramadi. Still questions remain 
as to the viability of these firms . At a conference in Dubai in May 2008, 42 
SOEs were put up for joint venture contracts, a halfway house between 
state ownership; and full privatization. None attracted bids.17 
Other Sectors 
In other sectors of the economy, the increase in income derived from 
transport and communication suggests that the rebuilding efforts have cre-
ated a number of linkages with the non-oil economy, perhaps laying a 
foundation for further growth. In fact, Ambassador Crocker noted that the 
expansion in cell phones was one of the major indicators of economic suc-
cess in the country. As he observed "An auction of cell phone spectrum 
conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers netted the government a better 
than expected sum of $3.75 billion." 
Again caution must be exercised in interpreting these trends and trans-
lating them into indicators of economic success. Brian Beutler18 has sum-
marized other interpretations of increased cell phone usage: 
The cell phone market in Iraq is indeed growing fast, and it's that market that drove 
competition for the country's wireless spectrum at last month's auction. But a rapidly 
growing cellular market is both difficult to quantify and, ironically, can be a sign of eco-
nomic weakness. Alex Rossmiller worked in Iraq as an intelligence office for the 
16Frank Gunter, op.cit., p. 7. 
''.Jack Fairweather, "State Enterprises Cautiously Reopen," Financial Times, June 17, 2008 
18Brian Beutler, "Cracker's Fuzzy Economics," Mother] ones. Com, September 13, 2007. 
http:/ /www. motherj ones. com/ cgi-bin/ print_article. pl ?url=h ttp : I lwww. moth erj ones. com/ 
news/update/2007/09/ ryan-crocker-fuzzy-economics.htrnl. 
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Department of Defense. He says "cell-phone use in Iraq is skyrocketing, primarily because 
the land-line infrastructure is so degraded, both from neglect during Saddam's rule and 
from our military operations against communications facilities in 2003." Similarly" 
Daniel Sudnick, who worked at the Coalition Provisional Authority as Paul Bremmer's 
senior adviser for communications, described it as an "irony" that part of the reason 
the cell phone industry has flourished is that resistance fighters don't often attack tow-
ers and other cell phone infrastructure, for a simple reason: They depend upon mobile 
phones, too . Moreover, Sudnick says the unstable monthly contracts are evidence of a 
broken system. "The economic reality in Iraq hasn't changed fundamentally since I've 
been there. They don't have a reliable, robust banking system over there. It's still a 
cash economy. And the only way to retain payment is with a prepaid system." 
Finally, the pattern of growth in the service sectors reveals the private 
sector's lack of dynamism. The growth in retail/wholesale trade as well as 
financial services has been particularly flat, with oil revenue and aid 
financed social services accounting for nearly all of the expansion in this 
sector's activity (Figure 3). 
Figure 3 
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The main consequence of the private sector's sluggish growth is high 
unemployment rates that have become chronic. Estimates vary, with 
unemployment figures ranging anywhere from 20-50 percent. Regardless 
of the exact magnitude of unemployment, there is little evidence of signif-
icant reductions taking place over the last several years. High unemploy-
ment has long fed Iraq's violence. The decision to disband Saddam 
Hussein's army, in particular, left thousands of men out of work, pushing 
many into the insurgency, militias, and increasingly violent criminal 
gangs.20 Even with violence at its lowest level in four years, the problems 
noted in agriculture and manufacturing noted above suggest reducing 
unemployment won't be simple. 
For its part, the Iraqi government launched a job-creation program in 
early 2008. Baghdad officials alone are hiring as many as 4,000 people a 
day, paying most a small daily rate to clean streets, do repair work and 
complete other small tasks like painting signs. 21 Many provinces have sim-
ilar programs, but in smaller numbers. Clearly this is only a temporary 
solution and it remains to be seen how long the current period of relative-
ly stability can continue without a significant improvement in the employ-
ment situation. 
Finally, Ambassador Cracker's report to Congress did not touch on the 
corrosive effect inflation is having on the economy. The consumer price 
index rose by 30.5 percent year-on-year inJuly 2007, with the fuel compo-
nent of the index rising by 90.2 percent. As with any inflation, fixed income 
groups in Iraq are suffering the most. In venting their anger at the govern -
ment, the effected groups will no doubt create even more political instabil-
ity. Reconstruction efforts are also being distorted by the rise in local prices 
and higher labor costs (in dollar terms). Since the majority of government 
spending is denominated in dinars, more oil export earnings (denominated 
in dollars) are required for any given item. "This is making the use of non-
Iraqi regional manpower more attractive as it is cheaper than employing an 
Iraqi workforce, thereby undermining economic regeneration.m2 
While the government has been able to bring the rate of inflation down to 
around 15%, many of its distorting effects remain. In addition, the govern-
ment has fought inflation largely through a policy of revaluing the Iraqi 
2
°Cf. Robert Looney, "Socio-Economic Strategies to Counter Extremism in Iraq," journal 
of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies XXIX:2 (Winter 2006), pp. 21-44. 
21Sally Buzbee, "Iraqis Face Unemployment Hurdles," Associated Press,July 18, 2008 
22
"lraq: Inflation Undermines Reconstruction and Reforms," OxfordAnalytica, September 
7, 2007, p. 1. 
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dinar-thus making imports cheaper. Although expedient, this policy has 
only created another set of distortions-the so-called "Dutch Disease" where-
by an overvalued currency discourages the production of traded goods and 
shifts resources to service activities. The longer-term effect compounds even 
more the problems noted above in re-starting agriculture and manufacturing. 
Progress From a Regional Perspective 
While the macroeconomic perspective provides some insights, both 
encouraging and discouraging, as to the nature of economic progress to 
date, one does not get a sense of the geographic dimension of activity. 
Clearly all parts of the country are not making comparable strides in recon-
struction or recovery. As Ambassador Crocker correctly implied improved 
economic conditions quickly follow political and security successes. 
In al-Anbar, the progress on the security side has been extraordinary ... Tribal representatives 
are on the provincial council, which is now meeting regularly to find ways of restoring serv-
ices, developing the economy, and executing a provincial budget These leaders are looking 
for help to rebuild their cities and talking of attracting investment Such scenes are also 
unfolding in parts of Diyala and Ninewa, where Iraqis have mobilized with the help of the • 
Coalition and Iraqi security forces to evict al-Qa'ida from their communities. The world 
should note that when al-Qa'ida began implementing its twisted vision of the Caliphate in 
Iraq, Iraqis, from al-Anbar to Baghdad to Diyala', have overwhelmingly rejected it. 
However, he goes on to warn that success is far from automatic: 
A key challenge for Iraqis now is to link these positive developments in the provinces to 
the central government in Baghdad. Unlike our states, Iraqi provinces have little ability to 
generate funds through taxation, making them dependent on the central government for 
resources. The growing ability of the provinces to design and execute budgets and the 
readiness of the central government to resource them are success stories. On September 5, 
Iraq's senior federal leadership traveled to al-Anbar where they announced a 700/o increase 
in the 2007 provincial capital budget as well as $50 million to compensate losses in the fight 
against al-Qa'ida. The support of the central government is also needed to maintain hard-
won security in areas like al-Anbar through the rapid expansion of!ocally-generated police. 
The Government of Iraq has placed some 21,000 Anbaris on police roles. 
An independent assessment made by Stuart W. Bowen, the Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIG IR), also notes some bright 
spots: 23 economic growth in the Kurdish north;2' tribal reconciliation in the 
23Statement of Stuart W. Bowen Jr. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
before the United States House of Representatives committee on Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, "Effectiveness of the Provincial 
Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq," October 18, 2007. 
" A good account of the Kurdish economic boom is given in John Irish, "Iraq's Building 
Hotspot," Middle East Economic Digest 51 :8, February 23, 2007, pp. 51-53. 
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western desert province of Anbar; and patchy progress in the development 
of local governments. Beyond that, some of the provinces are showing 
increasing ability to create plans, write contracts and carry out construction 
projects to rebuild Iraq's physical infrastructure.25 Skill shortages are, how-
ever impeding progress in many local governments and ministries. 26 
Unfortunately, many factors are still impeding progress in key areas 
across the country. For example: 27 
• the failure of the Council of Representatives to pass a provincial pow-
ers law that defines local governments' rights and responsibilities has 
limited provincial councils' effectiveness in managing their govern-
mental institutions; 
• weak and uncoordinated rule of law programs within the provinces 
and at the national level have been a continuing problem. In most 
provinces, there is little cooperation; 
• among the police, courts, and correction facilities, judicial orders are 
J 
routinely ignored; 
• efforts to increase local living standards and reduce unemployment 
have been undermined by the dangerous security situation, but 
micro-lending programs, agribusiness development, and small-busi-
ness development programs are beginning to make headway; 
• provincial governments have limited capacity to manage and sustain 
infrastructure and to budget for operations and maintenance, but 
some improvements have been noted in Iraqi management of local 
reconstruction projects; and 
• local political reconciliation efforts have been undermined in some 
areas by rival Shia groups, a sense of alienation among Sunnis, and 
growing frustration over the inability to obtain government services. 
"A good summary of the Bowen report is given in James Glanz, "Head of Reconstruction 
Teams in Iraq Reports Little Progress Throughout the Country," New York Times, October 
18, 2007. 
2
'"Skill Shortage Halts Progress," Middle East Economic Digest 51: 17, April 27, 2007, p. 21. 
2
'Ibid., p. 2. 
13 
At the risk of over-generalizing, the overall picture is one of high investment 
and rapid increase of incomes in the Kurdish regions, promise of stability and 
improved prospects in the Sunni region of Al-Anbar, and continued stagna-
tion in Baghdad with limited pockets of progress in the Southern provinces. 
The development of distinct regional or local economies has long been a 
concern to those desiring Iraq to be a strong, unified nation state. A recent 
study by Blomberg and Engel28 found considerable evidence of localized 
activity. Their study analyzed weekly price data for 255 goods from the 
eighteen Iraqi governorates over the years 2005-2008 to assess the extent 
that markets are development. As they note, the law of one price suggests 
that, after controlling for distance between major cities, prices should con-
verge in the presence of relatively free trade among the governorates. 
Their model suggests four empirical regularities associated with market 
development in Post-War Iraq. First, the degree of price distortion (i.e. 
price dispersion) has been approximately two times higher than those 
reported using similar techniques and data in the United States and Japan. 
Second, the degree of price distortion drops significantly during the period 
commonly referred to as "the surge" and rises afterward, though at a more 
modest pace. Third, the degree of price distortion is significantly smaller in 
areas in which the United States military presence was greatest, i.e., Sunni 
and Kurdish regions as opposed to Shia regions. Finally, there is limited 
evidence to suggest that the sub-national economies (Kurdish, Shia, and 
Sunni) are not completely economically integrated, though the "border 
effects" are smaller than those reported across countries in the trade litera-
ture. From these results, they conclude that there are "lines in the sand" 
rather than significant border impediments. "Taken together, these results 
suggest a significant role for violence and security in explaining market dis-
tortions and market integration and disintegration. "29 
One danger of the development of distinct regional economies is the 
balkanization of Iraq, which may in the long term impede efforts to con-
solidate the country around a strong central government. There are 
already an increasing number of examples of provinces defying the central 
government through such actions as withdrawing their electricity genera-
tion from the national grid.30 
"S. Brock Blomberg and Rozlyn C. Engel,, "Lines in the Sand: Border Effects, Economic 
Integration and Disintegration of Post-War Iraq," July 25, 2008 
29Blomberg and Engel, op. cit., p. 1. 
30
"Iraq: Infrastructure Seizure Reflects Central Power Ebb," Oxford Analytica, August 29, 
2007, p. 1. 
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Progress From an Economic Reform-Governance/Institutional 
Perspective 
As noted above, Iraq is beginning to make some economic progress. 
While much of the country's recent economic growth can be attributed to 
improved oil prices and to a lesser extent production volumes, the sus-
tainability of this growth is likely to depend on the ability of the country to 
press ahead with economic reforms and the development of supporting 
institutions. There is much work to be done : 
The Iraqi central government's administrative capacity and the country's economic 
progress still lag far behind the gains in security, and there is still much to be done 
before Iraq has a mature political system and a productive economy capable of meet-
ing the Iraqi people's basic needs. The Iraqi government has proved unable to spend 
more than a modest fraction of its own revenue, leaving the Iraqis largely unable to 
benefit from record-high oil prices. Unemployment is between 30 and 40 percent and 
there has been little documented progress in providing health care, education, sanita-
tion, clean water, or most other services." 
The progress that has occurred has been largely in the area of economic 
reforms.32 In trade for example, Iraq applied a flat tariff rate of 5 percent in 
2004. However, non-tariff barriers include significant delays in trade 
through customs as well as some import and export bans. 
Tax wise, the business climate was made favorable by capping both indi-
vidual and corporate income tax rates at 15 percent. Despite slow progress, 
some structural reforms, including steps to reduce subsidies and modern-
ize government financial management, have been made. Further modern-
ization of the tax system and introduction of a sales tax are under current-
ly under review. 
The elected Iraqi government created a new investment law in October 
2006, opening Iraq to foreign capital. Inflation and sluggish growth, com-
bined with a deleterious security situation and rampant corruption, are 
major hindrances to investment. Iraq does not subscribe to international 
arbitration agreements, although it does have a domestic arbitration frame-
work. The regulatory system is confusing, since most of the laws are new, 
having been established by the 2006 investment law, and thus fairly 
ambiguous for investors. Capital and profits can be transferred out of Iraq. 
Laws concerning state expropriation are not fully formed, though the con-
stitution reserves the power for national interest situations. 
3
'Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O'Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack, How to Leave a Stable 
Iraq, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2008. 
32The following review of economic reforms draws heavily on Index of Economic 
Freedom, 2008 (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 2008) 
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The Coalition Provisional Authority and the new Iraqi government 
have introduced many changes into Iraq's financial system. A March 2004 
banking law significantly liberalized and modernized the banking system, 
allowing credit to be allocated on market terms and making the central 
bank independent. 
Unfortunately, in the critical area of property rights, not much progress 
has taken place to date. For all practical purposes, there is no protection of · 
property in Iraq. Ongoing wartime conditions and a high degree of per-
sonal insecurity discourage investment. The absence of an enforceable 
legal system means that foreigners are further disadvantaged in terms of 
dispute resolution, although this affects local investors to a large degree as 
well. U.S. forces, working with Iraqi military and police units, are trying to 
improve conditions but still face daunting challenges. 
Many of the difficulties encountered in carrying out economic reforms 
stem from the country's lagging institutions and governance structures. At 
the broadest level, institutions can be defined as the structure of incentives 
that promote or impede entrepreneurial services and productive invest; 
ment. In many empirical studies, institutions are often measured by the 
extent to which governments are effective in promoting respect for the rule 
of law, contract enforcement, and the protection of property rights. 
A number of organizations, such as the Political Risk Services Group, the 
World Bank, and the World &anomic Forum, have developed surveys to 
measure over time the effectiveness of government institutions across a 
range of emerging market and industrial countries. These surveys typically 
score countries on an annual basis according to a variety of indicators, such 
as control of corruption, government effectiveness or bureaucratic quality, 
regulatory quality, political stability, and democratic accountability. 
These measures of government institutional capacity show clear weak-
nesses for the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region as a whole, and 
in some cases for the neighboring GCC oil producing countries. Several 
elements of government institutions that stand out in Iraq and the region 
are captured in the World Bank data set, which presents a set of estimates 
of six dimensions of governance covering 199 countries and territories for 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. In looking at 
Iraq's progress in the main areas of governance, it is useful to compare 
them to those achieved in the entire MENA area as well as those in the 
GCC. The World Bank data set's six dimensions of governance are: 
Voice and accountability. This variable measures various aspects of the 
political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators 
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demonstrate the extent to which the citizens of a country are able to par-
ticipate in the selection of government. Also included in this variable are 
indicators measuring the independence of the media. 
While Iraq certainly lies below the norm for the region, some progress 
has been made since the overthrow of Saddam (Figure 4). On this dimen-
sion, the country has risen from the 0 percentile in 2002 to the 10th per-
centile in 2007-i.e. 90 percent of the world's countries have achieved bet-
ter progress in this area. Still the country's score in this area has been ris-
ing, while in recent years both that of the MENA and GCC countries has 
been falling. 
Figure 4 
Progress in Governance: Voice and Accountability 
30 
----·-··-·--· 
ti - ........ 












1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 





- Non-GCC MENA 
• • • • • GCC 
=1raq 
Political stability and absence of violence. This governance cluster combines 
several indicators that measure perceptions of the likelihood that the gov-
ernment in power will be destabilized or overthrown. Unfortunately, in 
recent years, the World Bank has placed Iraq in the 0th percentile (Figure 
5). By comparison, the MENA average is slightly over the 20th percentile, 
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relatively unchanged since 1996. On the other hand, perhaps as a result of 
increased oil revenues, the GCC countries have had some improvement in 
this area in recent years, reaching the 58th percentile in 2007. 
Figure 5 
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Government effectiveness. This variable combines aspects of the quality of 
public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of 
civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pres-
sures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies. This 
has been a major area of concern for Iraq-little or no progress has 
occurred since 2003 (Figure 6), with the country languishing around the 
3rd percentile. In contrast, the MENA average is around the 33rd per-
centile, while the GCC countries are another 30 percentiles higher at the 
63rd percentile (2007) . Failure in this area has carried over to retard Iraqi 
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Regulatory quality. This aspect of governance focuses on the economic 
policies themselves. It includes measures of the incidence of market-
unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, 
as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in 
areas such as foreign trade and business development. Here there is room 
for a little optimism. Iraq has had slow but steady progress since 2004 
winding up at the 8th percentile in 2007 (Figure 7). While considerably 
below the MENA average 32nd (2007) and the GCC (68th), the country 
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Rule of law. Included in this dimension of governance are several indica-
tors that measure the extent to which the citizens of a country have confi-
dence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the 
incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and 
the enforceability of contract. 
This is the area of governance that Iraq has appeared to make the most 
progress in recent years. The country moved from the 0 percentile under 
Saddam in 2002 to 10th percentile in 2005. However, progress has been 
slow in the last three years, with Iraq holding this position through 2007 
(Figure 8). This is also an area of least gap with the MENA and GCC coun-
tries. MENA countries declined from the 20th percentile in 2005 to 16th 
in 2007 while the GCC average has also declined-from 27th in 2005 to 
23rd in 2007. 
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Figure 8 
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Control of corruption. This dimension of governance measures perceptions 
of corruption, with corruption defined as the exercise of public power for 
private gain. It is often a manifestation of a lack of respect of both the cor-
rupter and the corrupted for the rules that govern their interactions, and 
hence represents a failure of governance. 
Corruption is perceived as rampant in Iraq. Under the regime of Saddam 
Hussein, corruption was a fact of life for every Iraqi and touched on every 
economic transaction. The country has shown little or no progress. In 
2003, the country had reached the 10th percentile, but has subsequently 
averaged around the 3rd percentile with only a handful of countries con-
sidered more corrupt (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9 
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Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index33 is a com-
posite index that draws on multiple expert opinion surveys that poll per-
ceptions of public sector corruption. It scores countries on a scale from 
zero to ten, with zero indicating high levels of perceived corruption and ten 
indicating low levels of perceived corruption. Again Iraq has one of the 
lowest scores (1.9 for 2006), and the situation appears to have gotten worse 
over time. As of 2006, out of 163 countries examined, Iraq ranked only 
ahead of Haiti. By 2007 Iraq's score had fallen to 1.4 with only Myanmar 
and Somalia scoring lower at 1.3. However measured, this legacy of cor-
ruption remains a significant obstacle to Iraq's development. 
Challenges Ahead J 
Of the factors noted above deficient governance structures and institu-
tions appear to be the biggest impediment to Iraq's economic recovery. 
However, since the country's governance standards are so poor, making 
1 
3Yfhe results for various years can be found at: www.transparency.org/ . 
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connections between corruption and the slow progress of reconstruction is 
difficult. Do reconstruction cost overruns stem from corruption or from 
government incompetence? Does the diversion of reconstruction funds 
stem from corruption or the absence of the rule of law? Do infrastructure 
projects fail to attract follow-up private investment due to corruption or the 
level of violence? Most likely, all these factors are interrelated, thus neces-
sitating a comprehensive approach to combating the country's growing 
levels of corruption. 
For example, in many of the key public ministries that should be playing 
a lead role in the country's reconstruction, even rudimentary systems of 
accountability, internal controls, and the rule of law are lacking. The 
Interior Ministry epitomizes this sad state of affairs. Rather than enforcing 
the law in an impartial manner, the ministry is driven by political factions. 
It houses a myriad of competing police and intelligence agencies that pur-
sue various political or sectarian agendas. In the Oil Ministry, corruption at 
all levels has led to massive losses of revenue. At the border, travelers 
report that guards often regard bribes as a standard operating procedure. In 
the Health Ministry, the dire shortage of medicines and drugs in Iraqi hos-
pitals is largely due to the organized theft that takes place at every point in 
the supply chain. In the Defense Ministry, senior officials are under inves-
tigation following allegations that over one billion dollars worth of military 
equipment has been paid for, but was never delivered to army units. 
In the justice system, the police and judges in many areas have reverted 
to a system where families can only secure the release of their detained rel-
atives on payment of a bribe. It is now routine to hear reports of new offi-
cers who have just graduated from the police academy selling their hand-
guns on the black market. Even worse, many in the police are linked to, or 
are members of, assorted militias and criminal gangs-thus the distinction 
between the police, the political militias, and criminal groups is often mar-
ginal in the minds of Iraqis. In the southern provinces, where UK troops 
have regularly confronted 'insurgent' attacks, more often than not the 
insurgents are gangs of criminals or smugglers, loosely affiliated with a Shia 
militia, mainly concerned with preventing the closure of lucrative smug-
gling routes by Iraqi and UK forces. 3• With oil products still being mas-
sively subsidized in Iraq, the smuggling trade is still booming.35 
"As the storming of a police station in Basra by British forces in December 2006 showed, 
parts of Basra's police have been at the centre of the city's criminal activity. 
11Robert Looney, 'The Business of Insurgency: the Expansion of Iraq's Shadow 
Economy,' The National Interest 81 (Fall 2005), pp. 67-72. 
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Additional examples of widespread corruption, shoddy work, and poor 
management have been documented at length in a series of reports from 
the US Government's Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
(SIGIR); the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which is the 
investigative arm of Congress, and Corp Watch, a nonpartisan, not-for-prof-
it monitoring organization. 
In his April 2007 report, Stuart Bowen, the head of SIGIR, noted that his 
agency sampled eight projects and found that seven of them had significant 
operational problems either because the expensive equipment that was 
purchased was never used or there were other problems such as plumbing 
and electrical failures, lack of proper maintenance, and looting. 36 What was 
particularly troubling was that this report was focused only on projects that 
the administration had touted as successes. In actuality, these successes, 
should have been described as failures. 
• At Baghdad International Airport, where $11.8 million was spent on 
new electrical generators, $8.6 million worth of the project is no. 
longer functioning. 
• In a maternity hospital in the northern city of Erbil, a newly built 
water purification system does not function; an expensive incinerator 
for medical waste is padlocked, and medical waste-including 
syringes, used bandages, and empty drug vials-is clogging the 
sewage system and probably contaminating the water system. 
• At the same hospital, a system for distributing oxygen has been 
ignored by the medical staff, who told inspectors they distrusted the 
sophisticated new equipment and had gone back to using tried-and-
true oxygen tanks-which are stored unsafely throughout the building. 
• Expensive generators are missing from the Iraqi Camp Ur military 
base, having been hauled off to another post. Also at Camp Ur, three 
modular buildings constructed at a cost of $1.8 million were disman-
tled and removed with no explanation given. 
36Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, Moving Beyond the IRRF 
(Washington, SIGIR, April 30,2007). This source is the basis of the summary of SIGIR 
findings reported in the paragraphs that follow. 
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• Barracks renovated for enlisted soldiers are already in disrepair, just 
a year after being handed over to the Iraqi Army. 
Because these latest problems presumably developed after the US turned 
the projects over to the Iraqi government, there is widespread concern 
over the ability of the various ministries to sustain the reconstruction effort. 
How much of the difficulty can be attributed exclusively to corruption, 
however, is difficult to assess. 
In its report, SIG IR concluded that the Iraqi civil service is hampered by 
inadequately trained or unskilled staff. 'Iraqi government institutions are 
undeveloped and confront significant challenges in staffing a competent, 
nonpartisan civil service; effectively fighting corruption; using modem 
technology; and managing resources effectively.37 Furthermore political 
and sectarian loyalties have jeopardized the ministries' ability to provide 
basic services and build credibility among Iraqi citizens. In short, govern-
ment ministries are being staffed with party cronies and their budgets are 
being used as sources of power for political parties. 
SIG IR in particular noted that patronage in the ministries has led to staff 
instability, as key personnel are replaced when the government changes or 
a new minister is named. Some Iraqi ministries, including the Ministries of 
Interior, Agriculture, Health, Transportation, and Tourism, are being led 
by ministers who are aligned with political parties that are hostile to the 
international presence. These ministers have used their positions to pursue 
partisan agendas that conflict with the goal of building a government that 
represents all ethnic groups. 
In this environment, SIGIR notes that "Corruption jeopardizes future 
flows of needed international assistance and reportedly undermines the 
government's ability to make effective use of current reconstruction assis-
tance." Other factors contribute to the corruption problem: an ineffective 
banking system that leaves the government dependent on cash transac-
tions, opaque and obsolete ministry procurement systems, and inade-
quately resourced accountability institutions such as the ministries' inspec-
tors general. 
Aside from the lack of security, corruption is the biggest threat to 
progress in stabilizing Iraq. SIG IR reports that Iraq has been losing US $4 
billion to corruption every year since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. 
The country now has more then 1,400 criminal corruption cases open, 
3
'US Government Accountability Office, Stabili.;j,ng and Rebuilding Iraq: Conditions in Iraq 
are Conducive to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, Washington D.C., 23 April 2007, p.22. 
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involving about $5 billion. Paying bribes for services is now standard prac-
tice. Corruption is particularly endemic in the oil sector, with the Ministry 
of Oil hit by smuggling rackets that have reduced state oil earnings. At least 
10 percent of refined fuels are sold on the black market and about 30 per-
cent of imported fuels are smuggled out of Iraq.38 
On paper, Iraq has a strong set of institutions designed to address cor-
ruption issues: 
• The Board of Supreme Audit dates back to the 1920s. 
• The coalition installed inspectors general in all Iraqi ministries and 
also created a Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) to investigate 
the most serious cases of corruption.39 
• Since April 2003, a large amount of international assistance has gone 
into providing these institutions (and the Iraqi courts and police) with 
training, equipment and technical advice. 
Nonetheless, these anti-corruption institutions are very weak and easily 
influenced by political pressures, and it is common in today's Iraq to use 
charges of corruption to discredit officials who stand in the way of political 
objectives. This forces the coalition to remain the watchdog of last resort. 
However, in some ministries, such as Health and Interior, the US-appoint-
ed inspectors general have become political players rather than independ-
ent guarantors of probity.4° 
The breadth and depth of corruption has infuriated Iraqi citizens, who 
see politicians and officials growing rich while services decline. This has 
fed disillusionment with the US, UK, and Coalition presence, and may 
have contributed to support for militias and insurgents. Corruption also 
alienates international donors, who see much of their investment in Iraq 
going to waste. 
In order to address this issue, Iraq's key international partners have sug-
gested a range of schemes that include training investigators, protecting 
judges and witnesses, and reforming procurement and financial processes 
3~ames Glanz and Robert F. Worth, 'Attacks on Iraq Oil Industry Aid Vast Smuggling 
Scheme', New York Times, 4June 2006. 
"See Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 55, Delegation of Authority Regarding 
the Iraq Commission on Public Integrity, 27 Jan. 2004. 
'
0
"Iraq: Corruption Hurts Effort to Rebuild State," Oxford Analytica, April 21, 2007, p. I 
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to remove opportunities for fraud. However, without the political will of 
those at the top of the incoming Iraqi government, such technical assis-
tance will be of little use. The government's ability, let alone its determi-
nation to crack down on corruption, remains very much in doubt. 
Taking a substantial share of oil revenues (20-25%) out of the hands of 
corrupt politicians and placing it in that of the population at large is prob-
ably the most powerful anti-corruption policy available today. A direct dis-
tribution scheme of this type would also provide a number of immediate 
benefits to the economy and the recovery process: 
1. The Iraqi people would have increased incentive to protect the 
country's oil facilities by providing intelligence on insurgent groups 
attempting to disrupt the production and flow of oil. 41 
2. It might even help stem the insurgency, especially if much of that 
activity is driven by Sunni fears that they will receive considerably 
less than their accustomed amount under the new Constitution. 
3. Men and women would receive equal distributions. 
4. It would establish an irrevocable personal identity under the law-
essential for establishing titled property rights, bank accounts, 
human rights protection, voter lists and taxpayer lists. 
5. It would expand banking and credit access for small and medium 
business. 
6. It could help offset public resistance to gas price increases which ,will 
be needed to cut back oil smuggling. A related benefit is that it 
would also greatly help the government cut back on gas subsidies 
which currently amount to billions of dollars a year. 
"Gordon O.F. Johnson, "Iraq's Oil Revenues Should Empower the People," speech, 
Heritage FoundationJune 3, 2004. 
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7. Without equitable distribution of oil revenues, competition among var-
ious groups for oil money could turn ugly and could even erupt to vio-
lent conflict in Iraq. Rifts over oil revenues already run deep, as Iraqi 
Kurds, Arabs, and Turk.tnen struggle for control of oil-rich Kirkuk.42 
8. Citizens eligible for fund payouts would have an incentive to moni-
tor the government and participate in the political process to guard 
the value of their entitlement. 
9. Oil funds are likely to encourage efficiency in the petroleum sector. 
Since the size of payments to citizens will depend on the efficiency 
of the oil industry, this should contribute to political pressure to 
improve efficiency. 
10. Oil funds are expedient-rather than the long time intervals needed 
to improve government accountability and anti-corruption drives, 
they can be put in place immediately. They are doubly desirable ~ 
when governance is weak, and the need for institutions to handle oil 
revenues is immediate. 
A direct oil distribution scheme makes particular sense at this time given 
the fact that one of the main consequences of Iraq's deficient governance, 
especially with regard to government fiscal operations has been an inabil-
ity to implement capital projects. Expenditure data from Iraq's Ministry of 
Finance indicates that between 2005 and 2007, Iraq spent only 24 percent 
of the $27 billion it budgeted for its own reconstruction efforts.43 
Total government spending for capital improvements increased from 23 
percent in 2005 to 28 percent in 2007. However, Iraq's central ministries, 
responsible for security and essential services, spent only 11 percent of 
their capital investment budgets in 2007-a decline from similarly low 
spending rates of 14 and 13 percent in 2005 and 2006, respectively. 
Spending rates of central ministries that are critical to the delivery of essen-
tial services varied from the 41 percent spent by the Water Resources 
"Protecting the Future: Constitutional Safeguards for Iraq's Oil: An Iraq Revenue Watch 
Report, May 2005. 
"Gene L Doraro, Securing, Stabilizing, and rebuilding Iraq-Progress Report: Some 
Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed (Washington : United States Government 
Accountability Office,July 23, 2008), p. 9. 
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Ministry to the less-than-pne percent spent by the Ministries of Oil and 
Electricity in 2007. 
As noted earlier, due to increased production rates and higher oil prices, 
Iraq may finish 2008 with a cumulative budget surplus of as much as $80 
billion.44 Ironically Iraq has become one of the few countries in the world 
that does not face a conventional financial constraint-the country's main 
problem lies in overcoming institutional obstacles to converting its riches 
into jobs and sustainable economic growth. 
Assessment 
Clearly some economic progress is being made in Iraq. Can the incremental 
improvements over the last year or so somehow be the basis for the creation of 
a virtuous circle of improved standards of living, leading to a lessening of vio-
lence and higher rates of investment and economic expansion? While there are 
some encouraging signs, economic recovery is still very fragile. 
What accounts for the slow pace of recovery and growth until perhaps mid-
to late 2007? As noted, deficient governance structures have been a major 
obstacle to progress. On a more practical level, the failure to integrate economic 
programs more tightly with political and military dimensions is another major 
factor. Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the economy has largely been 
an afterthought; the result being that political and military gains were hard to 
sustain in an environment of grinding poverty and unemployment. 
One of the main lessons learned from the British experience in Southern 
Iraq was that: 45 
In conditions of economic stagnation the security forces find that they are dealing with 
general public order issues caused by significant numbers of ordinary disgruntled 
Iraqis, rather than the pure terrorist threat. What is required is a balanced approach 
with equal focus on the redevelopment of the domestic economy as well as the rebuild-
ing of the domestic security forces. 
Fortunately, both the U.S. and the Iraqis have heeded these warnings 
and, around the time of the Crocker report, economics was being intro-
duced and integrated into the country's counter-insurgency strategy. The 
initial results of this refocus on economic development have been quite 
encouraging. There are many other policies like the oil distribution scheme 
that are available and could complement a broad based economic strate-
gy. Hopefully, the next picture that the Crocker report will present to 
Congress will be of a half full, rather than half empty, glass. 
"BushraJuhi, "Iraqi Official Defends Spending Surplus," Kansas City Star, August 7, 2009. 
"Andrew Alderson, "The Economy, Stupid," Parliamentary Brief, October 2007, p. 9. 
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